separation of powers-as an essential element of the Founders' constitutional design.
II. MERRILL'S EVIDENCE
Professor Merrill produces no persuasive evidence to support his claim that "Justice Scalia has behaved strategically in seeking to influence the entire course of the Rehnquist Court over the last eight years."
14 Professor Merrill relies exclusively on "circumstantial evidence" to support his hypothesis. 15 Upon analysis, however, that evidence not only fails to support, but generally tends to refute, Professor Merrill's account.
First, Professor Merrill finds that nothing in Justice Scalia's background suggests an orientation favoring "devolution of power from the federal government to the states." 16 Specifically, Professor Merrill notes that Justice Scalia's "entire professional career had been in federal service or in teaching federal administrative law at national law schools." 17 The mere fact, however, that Justice Scalia had few occasions to consider federalism questions before joining the Supreme Court yields no evidence-circumstantial or otherwiseof his views on the topic. Similarly, the fact that then-Professor Scalia's scholarly interests lay elsewhere provides no basis for predicting how he would later rule on federalism questions as a judge sworn to uphold the Constitution.
Second, Professor Merrill notes that Justice Scalia considered the question of federal sovereign immunity early in his academic career, and recognized that the doctrine "has little claim either to historical legitimacy or practical efficacy." 18 According to Professor Merrill, "[s]omeone harboring these views about federal sovereign immunity would be unlikely to give an unqualified endorsement to state sovereign immunity." 19 The very article that Professor Merrill cites, however, draws a sharp distinction between the legitimacy of federal and state sovereign immunity by differentiating "'domestic' and 'foreign' sovereign immunity." 20 According to Professor Scalia, "foreign" immunity provides "exemption from the compulsory process of another sovereign," whereas "domestic" immunity refers to "exemption of the state's executive or legislative branches from the compulsory process of its own judiciary." 21 Thus, as Professor Scalia explained, the "eleventh amendment to the Constitution embodies only that 'foreign' immunity, protecting the states 14 The federal government, by contrast, has only "domestic" immunity from suit in federal court.
It is true, as Professor Merrill suggests, that Professor Scalia was critical of federal sovereign immunity. Such criticism, however, contrasts sharply with Professor Scalia's apparent willingness to embrace broad state sovereign immunity under the Constitution. For example, Professor Scalia criticized the Supreme Court's early practice of restricting Eleventh Amendment immunity to cases in which the state itself was the party of record. According to Professor Scalia, "[i]t eventually and inevitably became clear that the 'party of record' test . . . could not continue to be applied to the eleventh-amendment cases without flouting the clear intent of the Constitution." 23 Professor Scalia's only lament was that this necessary expansion of state immunity spread to federal immunity as well. Thus, Professor Scalia complained that, during the nineteenth century, "the Supreme Court treated cases arising under the eleventh amendment as involving essentially the same issue as those cases which dealt with the 'domestic' immunity of the United States itself." 24 "Consequently," Professor Scalia explained, "a change made to protect the states from the federal courts, as the Constitution required, had the very different effect of insulating the federal government from the federal courts, thereby casting a shadow upon the entire field of nonstatutory review." 25 These observations reveal that, as early as 1970, Professor Scalia believed that state sovereign immunity had a greater claim to constitutional legitimacy than federal sovereign immunity. 26 Third, Professor Merrill examines "Justice Scalia's pre-judicial attitude" with respect to "the more general topic of federalism." 27 Specifically, Merrill discusses a four-page speech that Professor Scalia delivered to the Federalist Society in 1982.
28
Professor Scalia cautioned those in attendance against "generalized hostility towards national law which has become a common feature of conservative thought." 29 Professor Merrill apparently (mis)reads this speech as hostile to constitutional federalism and treats it as circumstantial evidence of Justice Scalia's subsequent strategic behavior on the Supreme Court. Professor Scalia, however, actually endorsed a broad vision of federalism, properly understood. He explained:
In meeting to discuss federalism, we have to bear in mind that it is a form of government midway between two extremes. At one extreme, the autonomy, the disunity, the conflict of independent states; at the other, the uniformity, the inflexibility, the monotony of one centralized government. Federalism is meant to be a compromise between the two.
30
Thus, while recognizing the limited nature of federal power, Professor Scalia encouraged conservatives to use such power to achieve conservative ends. "When liberals are in power they do not shrink from using the federal structure for what they consider to be sound governmental goals. But when conservatives take charge, the most they hope to do is to keep anything from happening."
31
Professor Scalia's point was not that conservatives should disregard the constitutional limits of federal power. Rather, he merely suggested that they should use the federal government's undisputed power in constructive ways. For example, Professor Scalia cited "economic regulation" as "an area in which it is clear that the Founding Fathers meant the federal government to restrain the centrifugal tendencies of the states."
32 Professor Scalia specifically mentioned the possibility of preempting burdensome local cable regulations in order to implement a national free market policy. 33 Such a proposal suggests no hostility to constitutional federalism. As Professor Scalia emphasized:
I do not think the most dyed-in-the-wool anti-federalist among you would deny that the federal government has power to establish the regulatory environment for cable-which is, realistically, part of an interstate delivery system that brings information and entertainment from the production studios of New York and California to the individual home.
34
In the end, what Professor Merrill regards as evidence of hostility to federalism is, in reality, nothing more than a policy preference as to how the federal government should exercise its limited constitutional power. The negative Commerce Clause "drastically limits the States' discretion" and "has no basis in the Constitution." 46 According to Justice Scalia, the text of the Commerce Clause "is a charter for Congress, not the courts," to ensure free trade among the states. 47 Justice Scalia observed that the "pre-emption of state legislation would automatically follow, of course, if the grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce were exclusive."
48 Justice Scalia rejected this reading, however, because unlike other provisions, "the language of the Commerce Clause gives no indication of exclusivity,"
49 and "there is no correlative denial of power over commerce to the States in Art. I, § 10, as there is, for example, with the power to coin money or make treaties."
50 Justice Scalia also found that the "historical record provides no grounds" for the negative Commerce Clause. 51 After reviewing the ratification debates, Justice Scalia thought "it beyond question that many 'apprehensions' would have been 'entertained' if supporters of the Constitution had hinted that the Commerce Clause, despite its language, gave this Court the power it has since assumed." 52 The 76 More fundamentally, Professor Merrill does not acknowledge that the text of the Constitution often fails to address matters implicit in the constitutional structure. As Charles Black explained, it would be "intellectually satisfying," but "not true," to say that, for constitutional law, our legal culture "always purports to move on the basis of the interpretation of particular constitutional texts." 77 Although searching "the written text for its meaning in application to the presented case" 78 is the prevailing means of constitutional interpretation, Professor Black demonstrated that "the method of inference from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some principal part" also plays a significant role "in the development of our constitutional law." 79 
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Professor Merrill finds additional tension between "the new federalism and Justice Scalia's methodological convictions" in several cases in which "the Rehnquist majority has engaged in a close analysis of whether Congress has made sufficient 'findings' to justify its exercise of legislative power" under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 83 According to Professor Merrill, this "process-based review entails an extensive foray into legislative history and would seem to implicate all of the dangers of illegitimacy and manipulation that Justice Scalia has cited in opposing the use of legislative history to construe ambiguous statutes." 84 Here again, the "tension" that Professor Merrill identifies is more apparent than real. As the Supreme Court made clear in United States v. Lopez,
85
"Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce."
86 Although Congress made no findings to support the statute invalidated in Lopez, the Court suggested that such findings might be useful to the extent that they "enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye." 87 Five years later, the Court confirmed the limited role of congressional findings in United States v. Morrison. 88 On this occasion, Congress made findings that sex-based violence affects interstate commerce, but the Court considered such findings insufficient to establish the constitutionality of the statute in question. 89 The Supreme Court's limited use of congressional findings in Commerce Clause cases is fully consistent with Justice Scalia's reluctance to use legislative history to determine the meaning of ambiguous statutory texts. At most, the Court suggested that such findings might help the Court understand why Congress thought a particular statute fell within its constitutional power to enact. As Morrison demonstrates, however, congressional findings do not relieve the Court of its independent obligation to ascertain the meaning of the operative constitutional provisions. Textualists reject the use of legislative history as authoritative evidence of statutory meaning. 90 Professor Merrill also points to Justice Scalia's reliance on other aspects of the constitutional structure in Printz as evidence of strategic behavior. He argues that Justice Scalia "attempt[ed] to re-ground the anti-commandeering principle in the separation of powers doctrine of the unitary executive."
104 In Professor Merrill's view, such reliance on the separation of powers reveals Justice Scalia's "desire to use federalism cases to achieve other ends." 105 Professor Merrill's argument rests on the false assumption that there is no logical connection between the Constitution's separation of powers and federalism. In fact, many of the Supreme Court's most significant separation of powers decisions also safeguard federalism by preventing each branch of the federal government from circumventing federal lawmaking procedures designed to constrain federal action. 106 Thus, if commandeering undermines the federal separation of powers, then that conclusion constitutes crucial evidence in determining whether the Constitution's otherwise ambiguous provisions affirmatively authorize Congress to commandeer the states.
Professor Merrill next cites Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens
107 as an example of Justice Scalia's "desire to use federalism cases to achieve other ends."
108 He states that the Court took the case in order to resolve a circuit conflict over "whether the Eleventh Amendment bars an action against a state by an individual bringing a qui tam suit in the name of the United States."
109 After finding Article III standing, however, Justice Scalia's majority opinion avoided the Eleventh Amendment question by interpreting the term "persons" in the False Claims Act not to 102. Merrill, supra note 1, at 615. 103. Clark, supra note 76, at 1195 (noting that with respect to commandeering "all potentially relevant provisions of the constitutional text . . . are ambiguous in the sense that they neither expressly confer nor expressly deny congressional power to take the challenged action").
104. Professor Merrill fails to recognize, however, that the clear-statement requirement employed in cases like Vermont Agency itself constitutes an important doctrine designed to safeguard federalism. According to Justice Scalia, the Court's reading of the False Claims Act was buttressed by the rule that "'if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. '" 111 In support of this proposition, Justice Scalia cited Gregory v. Ashcroft, 112 a case written by Justice O'Connor and generally counted among the Rehnquist Court's significant federalism decisions. The clear-statement requirement applied in such cases protects the governance prerogatives of the states by upholding state law unless "Congress actually considered-and proceeded to enact into law-a proposal that threatens state prerogatives." 113 In other words, the doctrine ensures that the federal government incurs the decision costs imposed by federal lawmaking procedures-costs designed in large measure to preserve the states' ability to govern their own affairs.
III. SCALIA'S STRATEGY
Given that Professor Merrill's "internal strategic actor" hypothesis lacks meaningful support, one must look elsewhere to explain Justice Scalia's approach in federalism cases. Justice Scalia is an "originalist" when it comes to constitutional interpretation. The original Constitution "establishes a structure of government with two main features-federalism and separation of powers." 115 Professor Merrill assumes that separation of powers and federalism are mutually exclusive doctrines-that is, that commitment to one somehow precludes enthusiasm for the other. The Founders, by contrast, viewed these doctrines as mutually reinforcing features of the constitutional structure designed to serve the same ends. As James Madison explained:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. Justice Scalia generally takes an "'originalist' approach to constitutional interpretation."
118 This approach attempts "to establish the meaning of the Constitution, in 1789," by "examining various evidence, including not only, of course, the text of the Constitution and its overall structure, but also the contemporaneous understanding" of the Founders, the background reflected in the English constitution, and the understanding revealed by "the various state constitutions in existence when the federal Constitution was adopted." 119 Justice Scalia acknowledges both "that historical research is always difficult and sometimes inconclusive," 120 and that "almost every originalist would adulterate it with the doctrine of stare decisis." 121 In the end, however, Justice Scalia concludes that originalism is "more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system" than nonoriginalism.
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Thus, if one seeks to predict Justice Scalia's resolution of constitutional questions, the best indicator is likely to be the original understanding of the Constitution.
With respect to separation of powers, for example, Justice Scalia adheres closely to the Founders' view that "the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct." 123 The Founders believed the legislative department to be the most dangerous threat to 117. Madison also linked federalism, separation of powers, and individual liberty at the Virginia Convention:
Consider fully the principles of the Government. The sum of the powers given up by the people of Virginia is divided into two classes. One to the Federal and the other to the State Government. Each is subdivided in three branches. These may be kept independent of each other in the one as well as the other. In this system they are as distinct as is consistent with good policy. This, in my opinion, instead of diminishing, increases the security of liberty more than any Government that ever was. For the powers of Government which in every other country are given to one body, are here given to two; and are favourable to public liberty. Justice Scalia voted to invalidate the Independent Counsel statute because it interfered with the President's ability to control the execution of federal law.
Debates of the Virginia Convention
In his now-classic dissent, Justice Scalia stressed that "[t]he purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers in general, and of the unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but to preserve individual freedom." 126 Thus, he refused to go along with the majority's "ad hoc approach to constitutional adjudication," preferring "to rely upon the judgment of the wise men who constructed our system, and of the people who approved it, and of two centuries of history that have shown it to be sound." 127 Similarly, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 128 Justice Scalia invalidated a congressional attempt to reopen judicial judgments after they had become final. Speaking on behalf of the Court, Justice Scalia explained that the Founders "lived among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and judicial powers," 129 and, therefore, crafted Article III to give "the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them." 130 The Founders also believed that federalism-like separation of powerswould safeguard liberty. As Alexander Hamilton explained:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it SAINT Too much provision cannot be made against a consolidation [of the states]. The state governments represent the wishes and feelings and local interests of the people. They are the safe guard and ornament of the constitution-they will protract the period of our liberties-they will afford a shelter against the abuse of power, and will be the natural avengers of our violated rights. structure-and, hence, individual liberty-by "immeasurably" augmenting the power of the federal government at the expense of the states.
Debates of the Massachusetts Convention
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Contrary to Professor Merrill's reading, 140 Printz reveals that Justice Scalia-like the Founding generation-understood federalism and separation of powers not as unrelated or contradictory doctrines, but as complementary features of the constitutional structure designed to serve the same purpose: the preservation of individual liberty. As he explained in Printz: "'Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.'" 141 Justice Scalia expressly tied this understanding to that of the Founders by quoting Madison's "double security" passage from The Federalist. 142 Given that Justice Scalia regards both separation of powers and federalism as mechanisms for preserving individual liberty, it is perhaps not surprising that he voted to reaffirm Hans v. Louisiana 143 just one year after the Supreme Court decided Morrison v. Olson. 144 As discussed, Justice Scalia viewed the Court's decision in Morrison to uphold the Independent Counsel statute as inconsistent with the Constitution's separation of powers, and, hence, a threat to individual liberty. 145 As Professor Merrill points out, when Justice Scalia first joined the Court in 1986, he seemed "genuinely dubitante on the issue" of whether Hans should be overruled. 146 Three years later, Justice Scalia resolved any doubts by reference to "the original meaning of the Constitution" and stare decisis. 147 In voting to reaffirm Hans, Justice Scalia undoubtedly sought to uphold the Constitution's structural protection of individual liberty. Having seen the Court disregard the separation of powers in Morrison just a year earlier, Justice Scalia may have been especially eager to preserve federalism, the other principal feature of the constitutional structure "adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of our fundamental liberties." 148 
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[Vol. 47:753 IV. CONCLUSION Justice Scalia's commitment to the original understanding of the Constitution naturally leads him to embrace both federalism and separation of powers. Each doctrine is an essential feature of the original constitutional plan to prevent tyranny and safeguard individual liberty. Thus, it is entirely foreseeable that Justice Scalia-a self-described originalist-would seek to implement both features of the original constitutional structure. One might legitimately question the correctness of Justice Scalia's votes in particular cases, but the record simply does not support Professor Merrill's thesis that these votes were not sincerely cast. By embracing both federalism and separation of powers, Justice Scalia has simply attempted to uphold Madison's assurance that in "the compound republic of America," "a double security arises to the rights of the people." 149 149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 12, at 291.
